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A Constitution for Every Man 
William Van Alstynet 
Everyman's Constitution. By Howard Jay Graham. Madison: The State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1968. Pp. xiv, 631. $12.95. 
It may be exceptional to introduce a review of one man's book by 
beginning with a reference to a different author, but the unorthodoxy 
will save a great deal of time. Leonard Levy, professor of constitutional 
history at Brandeis University, has published several justly famous 
recent works including The Legacy of Suppression (an historical treat- 
ment of unfree speech), Jefferson on Civil Liberties, and The Origin 
t Professor of Law, Duke Univerity. 
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of the Fifth Amendment. The last, an unhurried review of the evolu- 
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination, earned a Pulitzer prize 
last year. Levy's brand is skeptical and liberal, and just now he domi- 
nates the field of constitutional historians. 
All the more reason, therefore, to pay attention to the Foreword to 
Howard Jay Graham's Everyman's Constitution, as it is written by 
Professor Levy and it assesses Graham's collected works in the following 
way: 
The year 1968 marks the one hundredth anniversary of the ratifica- 
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. A most fitting commemora- 
tion of that centennial is this collection of essays by Howard Jay 
Graham, who is surely the greatest authority on the history of the 
amendment. He is its Maitland, and perhaps our foremost living 
historian of American constitutional law as well.' 
Howard Jay Graham has played an important part in the devel- 
oping history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even as he chronicled 
its origins and purposes, he influenced its interpretation. By no 
coincidence, substantive due process of law as the mainstay of deci- 
sions against the constitutionality of government regulation came 
to an end when Graham provided the scholarly proof that the 
amendment was not designed to benefit business enterprise. Simi- 
larly, when he showed that the amendment emerged from the 
efforts of its framers to ensure that Negroes should have the same 
rights as other citizens, he provided the historical basis for deci- 
sions, which rapidly followed, in support of equal rights regardless 
of race.2 
And that, in brief, is a pretty fair review of Everyman's Constitution. 
The book assembles eleven articles previously published in various law 
reviews over a period of thirty years, adds two new chapters, and 
bridges the separations with editorial comment. The result is a smooth 
and comprehensive treatment of important fourteenth amendment his- 
tory. Its concern is seemingly with two discrete subjects, but in fact it 
presents a conscientious historian's brief for one principal theme. 
The early chapters revisit the conspiracy theory of the fourteenth 
amendment that corporations were intended to be protected by the 
due process clause-a theory most familiary associated with Roscoe 
Conkling's argument in San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R.R.,3 
and enlarged upon by the books of Charles and Mary Beard who ad- 
1. Levy, Foreword to H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUrION at vii (1968). 
2. Id. at vii-viii. 
3. 116 U.S. 138 (1885). Conkling's argument is reproduced in full in Appendix I to H. 
GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 594-610. 
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vanced an even broader economic interpretation of the Constitution.4 
The point of these early chapters, however, is not to analyze the 
narrow and currently uninteresting problem of whether corporations 
were in fact secretly intended to be included as persons entitled to sub- 
stantive due process protection under the fourteenth amendment. It is, 
rather, to move from a careful examination of the evidence respecting 
that alleged secret understanding to the broader question of con- 
spiracy: was the fourteenth amendment principally the product of 
selfish business interests? Was it designed to smuggle in a constitutional 
basis for protecting economic interests from social regulation by means 
of judicial review? Were abolitionist concerns, in fact, a mere front 
that provided the facade but not the real function of the fourteenth 
amendment? 
Graham's powerful (and successful) effort to exorcise this demonic 
theory is reinforced and complemented by the succeeding chapters on 
his second subject-the impact of the abolitionists on the formation of 
the fourteenth amendment. Together with ten Broek's The Antislavery 
Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment,5 Graham's one hundred page 
chapter on the antislavery backgrounds of the fourteenth amendment 
(which originally appeared in 1950,6 a year earlier than ten Broek's 
work) effectively rehabilitates the humanity of the fourteenth amend- 
ment-the amendment was indeed a constitutional commitment to 
equal rights, precisely as the Supreme Court initially interpreted it 
before veering away in favor of business interests for the next half 
century.7 
Beyond this, Graham's chapter titled Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth 
Amendment does much to aid our understanding of a continuing prob- 
lem in the use of historical materials to interpret the amendment. 
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court has 
appeared to encourage the use of historical research in aid of deter- 
mining whether each alleged form of discrimination was or was not 
understood to be forbidden by the equal protection clause. In calling 
for reargument in 1953,8 the Court asked counsel to determine whether 
Congress and the state legislatures contemplated that the fourteenth 
amendment would abolish segregation in public schools. It also asked 
4. See, e.g., 2 C. BEARD & M. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 111-14 (1928). 
5. J. TEN BROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951). 
6. Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment (pts. 
1 & 2), 1950 WIS L. REV. 479, 610. 
7. See the emphatic dicta of Mr. Justice Strong in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303 (1879) and Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). 
8. 345 U.S. 972 (1953). 
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whether, assuming that the immediate abolition of segration was not 
contemplated, the framers nevertheless understood that Congress or 
the Court would, under future conditions, have power to abolish 
segregation. Similar references to particular "understandings" were also 
diligently pursued in the reapportionment cases,9 the poll tax10 and 
literacy test"" cases, and the antimiscegenation decision.12 In each in- 
stance, the ensuing decision has been subject to considerable criticism 
-that whatever the liberal virtues of the results, they are insupport- 
able in terms of the framers' original understanding. Mr. Justice Har- 
lan's elaborate dissent in Reynolds'3 is particularly caustic on this 
point, and the many articles by Alfred Avins'4 carry the criticism for- 
ward on every other front. 
Graham's writing on "Our 'Declaratory' Fourteenth Amendment," 
however, effectively supports the wisdom of the second of the two 
questions posed by the Court in the 1953 Brown decision: not the one 
respecting immediate changes that the framers understood must ensue 
at once from ratification of the fourteenth amendment, but the one 
respecting Congress's (and the Court's) prerogative, if any, to enlarge 
upon those changes under future conditions. In Brown itself, the 
Court concluded conservatively that the evidence on this matter was 
inconclusive, and so the case was resolved almost entirely on other 
bases. Graham's writing is more aggressive in this respect. He argues 
that, in keeping with the open texture of the amendment's language, 
the animating spirit of the amendment was thematic and ideological, 
rather than detailed and legislative. The amendment thus embraced a 
capacity for growth in the particular application of its broad norms, 
rather than seeking to settle for all time a fixed and legislated answer 
to each possible controversy in terms of the conditions, perceptions, 
and information of 1866. To a large extent, this position is shared by 
Professor Bickel,15 and by Professor Kelly.16 Understanding of this 
view makes less unnerving the statement by Mr. Justice Douglas in 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, that: "Notions of what consti- 
9. See, eg., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
10. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
11. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
12. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
13. 377 U.S. at 589. 
14. See, e.g., Avins, The Right to Hold Public Office and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments: The Original Understanding, 15 U. OF KAN. L. REV. 287 (1967). 
15. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 62 (1955). 
16. See Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
119, 134 (1965); Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1049, 
1083-86 (1956). 
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tutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do 
change."'l7 
Graham does not bemoan the activism of the Supreme Court in its 
aggressive use of the fourteenth amendment to protect economic con- 
cerns. Rather, his is a more measured observation of heavy irony-viz., 
that the Court was most creative during the first half-century of the 
fourteenth amendment in areas of least importance to the amend- 
ment's origin and animating spirit, even while it was willfully un- 
creative in areas of the amendment's basic drive. Thus, his suggestion 
in the preface: 
My thesis is simply that what the United States, under these guar- 
antees, did for itself, and for corporations, in curbing manifest and 
latent hostility and antagonism to corporate enterprise, 1880-1940, 
the United States can and must do for itself, and for still disadvan- 
taged minorities, using the same techniques and weapons, supply- 
ing similar, and, in this case, intended process and protection."8 
The thought is not ill-considered as an historian's suggestion in 
righting history. Much of the Court's early development of substantive 
due process against local regulation of corporate interests was, after 
all, the product of Mr. Justice Field whose lack of interest in the 
amendment's abolitionist underpinnings may be partly understood 
from a segment of a letter he wrote to Professor Pomeroy, in 1882: 
"You know I belong to the class, who repudiate the doctrine that this 
country was made for the people of all races. On the contrary, I think 
it is for our race-the Caucasian race."19 Yet, far more of the actual 
formation of the fourteenth amendment was the product of men like 
Thaddeus Stephens who, dying just three weeks after the fourteenth 
amendment was proclaimed as ratified, was buried in a plain grave- 
yard in Pennsylvania beneath this epitaph: 
I repose in this quiet and secluded spot, 
Not from any natural preference for solitude 
But, finding other Cemeteries limited as to Race by Charter Rules, 
I have chosen this that I might illustrate in my death 
The principles which I advocated Through a long life: 
EQUALITY OF MAN BEFORE HIS CREATOR.20 
Mr. Justice Field having exercised a constitutional compassion for in- 
terests of enterprise during the longest tenure of any man in the his- 
17. 383 U.S. at 669. 
18. H. GRAHAM, supra note 1, at ix. 
19. H. GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 195. 
20. F. BRODIE, THADDEUS STEVENS 366 (1959). 
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tory of the Court, it may not be amiss in the last half of this different 
century that the Court has also exercised a constitutional compassion 
of the sort reflected in Thaddeus Stephens' epitaph. 
And this, of course, is the explanation of the title of Howard Jay 
Graham's book. It is not Everyman's Constitution in the sense of be- 
ing a layman's guide through highlights of the Constitution. It is, 
rather, a more technical but highly readable review of the fourteenth 
amendment's origins in support of the thesis that the amendment is 
itself a Constitution meant for everyone. 
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